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THE SLIPPERY SLOPE AND ITS TENDENCY TO RESULT IN
POOR POLICY DECISIONS

P. CASEY HALL*

When evaluating a potential outcome of a disputed issue, a 'slippery
slope' argument can almost always be made. In the abstract, it looks like
this: if acceptable proposal, X, is adopted, unacceptable position, Y, will
inevitably follow. In other words, if citizens are allowed to carry concealed
handguns, it will lead to shootouts in the streets.! In situations such as this,
the slippery slope argument urges policy makers to base their decision on
fear of an avoidable result rather than the merits of the policy in question.
While the slippery slope argument is often effective, its use generally leads
to sub-optimal policy decisions.
This paper considers the role of the slippery slope argument in three
sections. The first section, Quantitative Analysis, proposes a mathematical
formula for understanding the underlying mechanics of the slippery slope
argument. The second section, Slippery Slope Arguments in Public Policy
Debates, examines the use of the slippery slope in practice. Finally, the
third section, Use of the Slippery Slope in the Courtroom, explores the
function of the slippery slope in judicial decision making.
I. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS
It is important to understand the underlying mechanics of the slippery
slope. This section breaks down the argument into its constituent parts
(four prerequisite conditions for the argument and three variables that
determine its effectiveness) and quantifies them for further analysis. It is
also important to clearly define a slippery slope argument.2 This author
* The author is a student at the University of St. Thomas School of Law in Minneapolis,
Minnesota. He would like to thank Dr. Charles Reid for his guidance and encouragement in
preparing this piece. He would also like to thank his wife Ann and son Oliver for their support
and inspiration.
1. Eugene Volokh, Mechanism of the Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV (2003). This article

provides a comprehensive analysis of the Slippery Slope argument. While his conclusions are
often at odds with the conclusions of this paper, his article provides a substantial resource for this
discussion. The context for that article is the debate over gun control.
2. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 364-68. (1985) (providing an
extended "analytic isolation" of the slippery slope argument for the purposes of that article). My
brief explanation of the slippery slope argument that will be addressed mirrors his comprehensive
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defines a true slippery slope as: the acceptance of X will lead to an
unacceptable increase in the likelihood of Y. This type of argument is
generally offered in an effort to stop the adoption of a certain policy.
However, if X is a good policy decision but is not undertaken because of a
threatened but avoidable risk of Y, public policy will suffer from slippery
slope inefficiency.' For the sake of clarity, this author will use the common
phrase "give them an INCH (X) and they will take a MILE (Y)" in the
examples below.
There are four conditions that are generally present when a slippery
slope argument is made. First, one side is opposed to INCH (either on its
own merits or because of its likelihood to lead to MILE).4 Second, there
must be an audience that is undecided as to whether INCH is acceptable (if
the audience is simply against INCH, the slippery slope argument is more
like rhetoric). Third, in order for the argument to have any persuasive
influence, MILE must be less desirable than INCH (to be truly effective
there should be near unanimity as to the undesirability of MILE). Fourth,
there is a perceived possibility that INCH will lead to MILE.
There are also three variables that must be considered when quantifying
a slippery slope argument: (1) the level of support for INCH among the
audience (S); (2) the level of disapproval of MILE among the audience (D);
and (3) the increased likelihood of MILE as perceived by the audience if
INCH is accepted (L).5
To illustrate, given:
S = Current level of support of INCH, 1 - 10
D = Current level of disapproval of MILE, 1 - 10
L = Increased likelihood of MILE if INCH is accepted, 0-1
Suppose:

definition. I attempt to make a similar stipulation here that will allow an examination of what I
call true slippery slope arguments.
3. Eric Lode, Slippery Slope Arguments and Legal Reasoning, 87 CAL. L. REV. 1469

(1989).
4. For the purpose of the quantitative analysis I will accept the proposal that the slippery
slope argument most often does not concede that the instant case is acceptable on its own but that
we should not accept it because of the chance of sliding down the slope to an unacceptable result.
Although it may be the case that some slippery slopes are employed by a speaker that does not
oppose the instant case on its own merits more often it is not. See Ann Scales, Feminist Legal
Method: Not so Scary, 2 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 15 (1992). "Second, the slippery slope is often
disingenuously invoked. In structure, the slippery slope argument concedes the innocuousness of
regulating the instant case but posits impossibly harder cases down the road."
5. For a review of the use of quantitative analysis as a tool for dissecting logical arguments
see E. J. LEMMON, BEGINNING LOGIC (Hacket Publ'g 1965).
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There is an audience neutral towards INCH (S = 5); and
that audience is opposed to MILE (D = 8); and
an advocate makes a strong argument that INCH leads to MILE
(L = .75).
Then:
Taking D and multiplying it by L results in a new disapproval level, D':
(D x L) =D'
8 x .75 = 6
Therefore:
Since the magnitude of D' is 6, and S remains unchanged at 5, the
negative reaction to MILE still outweighs the positive value of INCH.
(D x L) =D' > S
8x.75=6>5
Note that, keeping all else the same while decreasing the magnitude of
L can result in the slope becoming less slippery:
Assume:
A decrease in the likelihood of INCH leading MILE (L = .5).
Then:
D' is now 4 while S remains unchanged at 5.
Therefore:
The negative reaction to MILE no longer outweighs the positive value
of INCH.
(D x L)= D'< (S)
8x.5=4<5
The foregoing section elucidates the simple dynamics of the slippery
slope argument. Regardless of how slippery a slope is, D' of MILE must be
greater than S of INCH; otherwise, the slippery slope argument will be
ineffective.
The greater an individual's ability to demonstrate the
slipperiness of a slope (L), the more effective a slippery slope argument will
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be.

H. SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENTS IN PUBLIC POLICY
DEBATES
This section considers the use of the slippery slope argument in public
policy debates in four parts. The first part, The Choice of Two Evils,
illustrates the absurd choices a policy maker will face when advocates on
both sides of an issue employ slippery slope arguments. The second part, Is
There any Beneficial Use of the Slippery Slope?, explores the potential use
of the slippery slope argument as an analytical tool. The third part,
Manipulating the Slipperiness of the Slope, considers different ways to
affect the variables of a slippery slope argument in order to make it more
effective. Finally, the fourth part, Inefficiencies of the Slippery Slope,
demonstrates the process by which a slippery slope argument may heighten
fear of an avoidable consequence and result in rejection of sound public
policy.
A. THE CHOICE OF TWO EVILS

Slippery slope arguments are notoriously easy to make. For any policy
choice, one can dream up some disastrous result that might occur down the
road. The result of both sides employing a slippery slope argument is that
either choice appears to lead to disaster. In light of this, the slippery slope
argument adds little to any debate and instead encourages a contest of
which side can imagine a worse result.
Eugene Volokh has defended the use of a slippery slope argument in
reference to the right to carry firearms.6 I will borrow this issue as an
illustration. When one side argues that allowing concealed carry leads to
shootouts in the streets and the other side argues that prohibiting concealed
carry leads to criminal takeover, it is more difficult to identify the better
policy.
No one wants shootouts in the streets; public opinion is united on this
point. One can assume, however, that part of the population is undecided
about whether citizens should be able to carry concealed weapons. If this
undecided faction accepts the premise that concealed carry will lead to
shootouts, it will decide that granting the right to carry a concealed weapon
is not worth the resulting shootouts. The same argument can be made in the
other direction.
Which side is right? Maybe both are correct. When a decision whether
to allow concealed carry must be made in light of these arguments, policy
makers appear to be choosing between shootouts and criminal takeover.
6.

Volokh, supra note 1.
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What if neither side is right? What if, while allowing conceal carry, it
remains possible to stop a slide down to shootouts? Or, in the event gun
laws are tightened, it remains possible to get off the slope before society
finds itself in the midst of criminal takeover? One or both of the slippery
slope arguments must be refuted in order to identify an acceptable choice.
An effective slippery slope argument hinges upon the connections
between the proposal at issue and the threatened catastrophic result. Why
would allowing concealed carry result in shootouts? How certain is the
threatened catastrophic result? If policy makers are able to distinguish
between the proposal at issue and the catastrophic result now, why won't
they be able to make this distinction later?
B. Is THERE ANY BENEFICIAL USE OF THE SLIPPERY SLOPE?
Slippery slopes can force people to examine the underlying rationale of
an argument. Consider the concealed carry hypothetical above. Several
logical frameworks support a pro-gun position. Police carry guns and they
deter crime; if more individuals carry guns more crime will be deterred.7
Criminals disregard concealed carry laws so the only individuals barred by
anti-gun legislation are those that would carry them for good purposes.
Finally, the U.S. Constitution protects every individual's right to bear arms,
so a state does not have the authority to bar it citizens from carrying guns.
At the same time, these logical frameworks can also support the anti-gun
position. Police carry guns and they deter crime; therefore it is unnecessary
for individuals to carry concealed guns.
If a pro-gun advocate bases his or her argument on the Constitution, the
implication is that everyone should be able to carry a concealed gun. Going
down a slippery slope, this sets the stage for the shootouts. But are anti-gun
laws the only thing standing between the current state of affairs and the OK
Corral? Is it not likely that fear of death, fear of arrest, and morality also
act as adequate safeguards against shootouts? As one can see, it is often
difficult to discern an exact causal relationship.
On a theoretical level, the use of the slippery slope argument leads to an
absurd choice between two unacceptable results. However, in practice it
occasionally has utility. The advocate who is aware of the pitfalls of
slippery slope arguments is able to identify the underlying validity (or
invalidity) of such arguments. In doing so, the advocate may be able show
that an opponent's reasoning does not necessarily lead to the proposed bad
result.

7. JOHN R. LOTr, JR., MORE GUNS, LESS CRIME:
CONTROL LAWS (Univ. of Chicago Press 1998).

UNDERSTANDING CRIME AND GUN
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C. MANIPULATING THE SLIPPERINESS OF THE SLOPE

There are ways to make a slippery slope argument more effective. This
can be done by adjusting its variables.
1. Changingthe Acceptability of Y.
An opponent of X might attempt to make Y so undesirable that an
audience will be unwilling to accept even a very slight risk of Y occurring.
Consider the debate surrounding physician assisted suicide.8 If a speaker
can convince her audience that physician assisted suicide will lead to
summary execution at age 30, that audience is unlikely to even consider
physician assisted suicide.9
A proponent of X should try to minimize the disapproval of Y. For
example, in the debate surrounding gay marriage, polygamy is often offered
as the disastrous result. Supporters of gay marriage would benefit if they
were able to reduce the disapproval of polygamy. Interestingly, supporters
of gay marriage have not attempted this. Instead, they have attempted to
decrease the likelihood of gay marriage leading to polygamy.l"
2. Minimizing the Possibilityof Slippage
Supporters of X may argue against the strength of causal links between
X and Y and suggest that the slope is not as steep as the opposition asserts;
thus, X will not necessarily lead to Y. Also, X's supporters may concede a
link between X and Y, but that the slope can be stepped off of at any point.
If allowing X automatically leads to Y, it would be a simple 'if then'
argument. However, a proper slippery slope argument must have several
intermediary steps between X and Y.l" Because these steps between X and
Y exist, there should be an opportunity to get off the slope at those steps.' 2
8. Thomas Szasz, Killing Kindness, REASON, May, 1994, at 40.
9. LOGAN'S RUN (MGM 1976) (in this science fiction movie citizens are summarily
executed at the age of thirty).
10. Conservative commentators have repeatedly made the slippery slope argument from gay
marriage to polygamy. For example, The Weekly Standard contained the article Beyond Gay
Marriage. This article contained a quote that attempted to disassociate gay marriage from
polygamy. "Andrew Sullivan, one of gay marriage's most intelligent defenders, labeled the
question fear-mongering-akin to the discredited belief that interracial marriage would lead to
birth defects. 'To the best of my knowledge,' said Sullivan, 'there is no polygamists' rights
organization poised to exploit same-sex marriage and return the republic to polygamous abandon.'
Actually, there are now many such organizations. And their strategy--even their existence--owes
much to the movement for gay marriage." Stanley Kurtz, The Road to Polyamory, WEEKLY
STANDARD, August 4, 2003.
11. Lode, supra note 3, at 1477.
12. Stephen Smith, Fallacies of the Logical Slippery Slope in the Debate on Physician
Assisted Suicide and Euthanasia, 13 MED L. REV. 224, 239 (2005) (Smith disagrees with the
assertion that a Doctor will make a unilateral decision to end a patient's life, noting that most of
the proposed legislation relating to physician assisted suicide require a second independent
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A person who employs a slippery slope argument should be put to her proof
to explain why a principled line can not be drawn between X and Y.
While it benefits the party employing a slippery slope argument to
enumerate the reasons X will lead to Y, the party in support of X should
make clear that the burden of proving the linkage is on the opposition. The
party in support of X can weaken or nullify a slippery slope argument to the
extent it shows that X does not necessarily lead to Y. As noted above, this
is done by either reducing the link between X and Y, or by providing
stepping off points along the slope.
D. REDUCING INEFFICIENCIES OF THE SLIPPERY SLOPE

Should policy makers yield to the logic of the slippery slope, they may
be tempted to settle for less than optimum policies. Imagine a city council
is considering a policy that will provide subsidies to individuals who open a
small business. The council finds that the subsidies are cost effective, that
they are in line with the city's economic development plan, and that there
exists a sufficient need. However, certain members of the council are
concerned that if they approve this measure they will soon have to approve
subsidies for medium and large businesses. They worry that corporate
welfare will soon dry up the city's coffers. Therefore, the council should
determine whether a non-arbitrary line can be drawn that allows subsidies
for small businesses but not for medium and large businesses. In the end,
without proper analysis, the small business subsidy may be rejected not on
its own merits, but for fear of corporate welfare.
Unfortunately, this analysis is often overlooked. In the city council
example above, the specter of corporate welfare may persuade a sufficient
number of council members to block the passage of small business
subsidies, even though providing such subsidies seems to be a sound policy
decision. When a slippery slope argument hangs as an amorphous dark
cloud, without ever being fully explained or dispelled, public policy suffers.
This loss of value is an inefficiency of the slippery slope argument. 3
When the promoters of the slippery slope argument are put to their
proof, inefficiencies, if they exist, become clear. In regards to the small
business subsidies above, opponents might argue that it is simply unfair to
grant subsidies to small businesses and deny them to medium and large
businesses. This unfairness argument may at first seem persuasive. How
can the council grant subsidies to one sector and deny them to another?

consideration of the patient's interests).
13. Volokh, supra note 1, at 1036. "The existence of the slippery slope creates what I will
call the slippery slope inefficiency: decision A might itself be socially beneficial, and many people
might agree that it's beneficial; but some swing voters' concern that A will lead to B might
prevent decision A from being implemented."
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This appears to be a double standard. Actually, a clearly defined standard is
the key to dispelling the unfairness argument.
As outlined above, the council found that subsidies for small businesses
are cost effective, in line with the city's economic development plan, and
sufficiently needed. The council's determination of cost-effectiveness
likely means that the projected tax revenue from the increase in small
business activity will at least offset the costs of small business subsidies.
Presumably, subsidies for larger businesses are not as cost effective. Now a
line can be drawn without seeming unfair.
In order to effectively combat a slippery slope argument, it is important
to clearly define the rationale for a policy change. Clear standards reduce
slippery slope inefficiency by allowing decision makers to use their best
judgment with the security that their choices will not lead to disastrous
results.

III. THE USE OF THE SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT IN THE
COURTROOM
Slippery slope arguments in the courtroom have a slightly different
character than in other public settings. 4 In non-courtroom settings, causal
links between X and Y are often inadequately addressed. Why will
allowing X significantly increase the likelihood of Y? In the courtroom,
part of the 'why' is already in place-stare decisis. Courts must consider
whether their reasoning for holding X today may mandate holding Y in the
future. That said, the use of a slippery slope argument within a single case
(where the fact finder is most concerned with specific facts and
circumstances) has the same inherent problems as does its use anywhere
else. This section is broken into three parts. The first part discusses the use
of slippery slope arguments within the context of a single case. The second
part discusses slippery slope arguments within the context of precedent.
Finally, the third section outlines Justice Scalia's concern about sliding
down a slope after the Supreme Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas. 5
14. Frederick Schauer, Slippery Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REv. 361, 362. Professor Schauer
offers a helpful list of examples of reactions to the slippery slope argument in the legal
framework. "But why should this be? What induces people to believe that in some cases neither
doctrinal limits nor judicial intervention can prevent the slide down the slippery slope? Indeed,
the ancient lineage of slippery slope arguments is paralleled by the equally lengthy pedigree of
reactions against them. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 344 (1810), Justice
Story noted that 'it is always a doubtful course, to argue against the use or existence of a power,
from the possibility of its abuse.' The same point was made by Justice Holmes when he argued,
dissenting in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox 277 U.S. 218, 223 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting), that
'the power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits.' And we are still frequently
reminded that one major purpose of doctrine is to provide those very toeholds that keep us from
sliding to the bottom of the slippery slope." (footnotes omitted).
15. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S 558 (2003).
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A. SLIPPERY SLOPES WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF A SINGLE CASE

When a slippery slope argument is used within the confines of a single
case, the precedent-setting concern is not present. Consider Bertram v.
Zoning Commission of the City of Bridgeport.16 In that case, a property

owner applied for a zoning change in order to operate several small stores
on his property.
Although his request complied with the city's
Comprehensive Plan, a number of residents opposed the change. The
residents argued that any business zoning, however small, would make
further business zoning more likely. Although the court decided the case on
other grounds, it dismissed the protests of the citizens because "[t]he
reasons given before the commission by those who opposed the change
were quite largely based on fear that other like changes might be made
rather than upon the effect of the particular one in question."' 7
The effect that the citizens wanted the court to consider was the
diminution of property values that would be caused by not only this rezoning (X), but by potential future re-zonings (Y). The citizens would have
had a much cleaner and more straightforward argument had they limited
their protests to X rather than Y.
Consider further Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York. 18 In
that case the Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a New York statute
which exempted from property taxes real estate that was used for religious
purposes. Concurring in the judgment, Justin Harlan discussed the Court's
duty to make fine distinctions:
I recognize that for those who seek inflexible solutions this
tripartite analysis provides little comfort. It is always possible to
shrink from a first step lest the momentum will plunge the law into
pitfalls that lie in the trail ahead. I, for one, however, do not believe
that a 'slippery slope' is necessarily without a constitutional
toehold. Like THE CHIEF JUSTICE I am of the view that it is the
task of this tribunal to "draw distinctions, including fine ones, in the
process of interpreting the Constitution." The prospect of difficult
questions of judgment in constitutional law should not be the basis
for prohibiting legislative action that is constitutionally permissible.
I think this one is, and on the foregoing premises join with the
Court in upholding this New York statute. 9
Here, Justice Harlan makes the seemingly obvious point that it is the
role of the Supreme Court to exercise its judgment concerning the
constitutionality of statutes. This ability, and the legislature's awareness of
this ability, is valuable to the process of public policy creation.
16. Bartram v. Zoning Comm'n of the City of Bridgeport, 68 A.2d 308 (Conn. 1949).
17. Id. at 311.
18. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of the City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
19. Id. at 699-700 (Harlan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
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In Walz, Chief Justice Burger provides a more general rebuke of the
petitioner's slippery slope argument, which suggested that exempting
churches from taxation would lead to a state-established religion.
Nothing in this national attitude toward religious tolerance and two
centuries of uninterrupted freedom from taxation has given the
remotest sign of leading to an established church or religion and on
the contrary it has operated affirmatively to help guarantee the free
exercise of all forms of religious belief. Thus, it is hardly useful to
suggest that tax exemption is but the 'foot in the door' or the 'nose
of the camel in the tent' leading to an established church. If tax
exemption can be seen as this first step toward 'establishment' of
religion, as Mr. Justice DOUGLAS fears, the second step has been
long in coming. Any move that realistically 'establishes'20 a church
or tends to do so can be dealt with 'while this Court sits.'
While Chief Justice Burger's comments were made with the advantage
of hindsight, they point toward an ability of the Court to effectively
differentiate between good and bad policy without being handcuffed to the
slippery slope. In contrast, the Supreme Court in Washington v. Glucksberg
upheld a ban on physician assisted suicide because it feared that individual
physicians would lack the ability to step off the slippery slope and, in the
end, perform involuntary euthanasia.2' Justice Souter, in his concurrence,
provides an in-depth analysis of the Court's understanding of unenumerated
liberty interests. He indicated that there may be room within substantive
due process for a right to die. However, his decision was informed by
practical considerations regarding whether physicians would step off the
slippery slope prior to reaching involuntary euthanasia:
[Physicians] have compassion, and those who would be willing to
assist in suicide at all might be the most susceptible to the wishes of
a patient, whether the patient was technically quite responsible or
not. Physicians, and their hospitals, have their own financial
incentives, too, in this new age of managed care. Whether acting
from compassion or under some other influence, a physician who
would provide a drug for a patient to administer might well go the
further step of administering the drug himself; so, the barrier
between assisted suicide and euthanasia could become porous, and
the line between voluntary and involuntary euthanasia as well. The
case for the slippery slope is fairly made out here, not because
recognizing one due process right would leave a court with no
principled basis to avoid recognizing another, but because there is a
plausible case that the right claimed would not be readily
containable by reference to facts about the mind that are matters of
difficult judgment, or by gatekeepers who are subject to temptation,
20.
21.

Id. at 678.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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noble or not.22
Justice Souter provides convincing reasons why allowing assisted
suicide may increase the risk of involuntary euthanasia. These reasons
include the compassion of doctors as well as unseemly financial concerns.
Such reasons demonstrate that involuntary euthanasia is a reasonable
expectation of a policy decision to allow assisted suicide.
Concerning issues within a single case, the Court has displayed
confidende in its own ability to step off the slope. At other times, when the
duty to step of the slope rests in the hands of others and there is too large a
risk of unacceptable results, the Court has not expressed confidence that the
slope can stepped off of. While purveyors of slippery slope arguments
hinge their concerns on an inability to apply the brakes at reasonable
stopping points, this stopping action is one of the primary purposes of our
court system. Because not all legal decisions are as simple as applying the
law to facts, we have entrusted judges to discern when we can safely step
off the slope.
B.

CONCERNING PRECEDENT

While a court can compartmentalize the use of a slippery slope
argument within a single case, the precedential effect of any one case upon
another creates a separate inquiry. This inquiry considers how today's
decision (X) affects the likelihood of an undesirable future decision (Y)
(where Y would not occur but for X). The concern in the previous section
was the effect that a decision would have upon policy makers outside the
judiciary, whereas the concern in this section is the effect that judicial
decisions may have upon subsequent judicial decisions.
How can this new concern be overcome? Judges could decide not to
publish any of their opinions. But this would lead to the end of case
citations in all legal documents-a slippery slope, indeed. Obviously, this
'solution' will not work. Since abandoning precedent is unacceptable, a
different solution to the concern must be found.
Even Justices of the Supreme Court have disagreed on how to resolve
this concern. This is illustrated by a discourse between Justices Harlan and
White. In Baldwin v. New York, Justice Harlan asked in his dissent, "if 12
jurors are not essential, why are six? What if New York... concludes that
three jurors are adequate. . . ?,2 Justice White, in Williams v. Florida
(issued on the same day as Baldwin), immediately responded to Justice
Harlan by noting that Harlan's logic "suffers somewhat as soon as one
recognizes that he can get off the 'slippery slope' before he reaches the

22. Id. at 784-85.
23.

Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 126 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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bottom. We have no occasion in this case to determine what minimum
number can still constitute a 'jury,' but we do not doubt that six is above
that minimum."24

It is this author's opinion that decisions about where to draw the line
need not be arbitrary. Courts may look to historical context, constitutional
principles, and their reasonable discretion to draw lines at proper stopping
points. Courts should be able to determine when they have found
something like Dworkin's 'right answer.'25
C. BLOCKING THE ROAD FOR THE PARADE OF HORRIBLES

Justice Scalia articulates serious concerns with slippery slopes in his
Lawrence dissent. He first outlines what he believes is the misuse of
historical context and constitutional principles in the progression of
substantive due process cases.26 He further argues that the Court has
invalidated society's moral views on sexual behavior as legitimate grounds
upon which law may be based. Of interest here is Justice Scalia's parade of
horribles"
[It is] society's belief that certain forms of sexual behavior are
"immoral and unacceptable." This is the same justification that
supports many other laws regulating sexual behavior that make a
distinction based upon the identity of the partner-for example,
laws against adultery, fornication, and adult incest, and laws
refusing to recognize homosexual marriage.2"
State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest,
prostitution, masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and
obscenity are likewise sustainable only in light of Bowers'
validation of laws based on moral choices. Every single one of
these laws is called into question by today's decision.29
Justice Scalia's concerns are not without force. If the reasoning in
Lawrence is extended, then laws that are based solely upon societal beliefs
about what is immoral and unacceptable will be open to challenge.
However, some laws of concern to Justice Scalia have broader

24. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 92 & n.28 (1970); see also id. at 116-17 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (a defense of Justice Harlan's argument).
25. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE (Harvard Univ. Press 1985) (Professor
Dworkin argues against the proposition that there are no right answers in hard cases. Rather, that
there is almost always a right answer even if it is not known).
26. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 594-98.
27. Justice Frankfurter was the first Supreme Court Justice to use the term 'parade of
horribles' in an opinion. In his dissent he argued that allowing the government to search a private
residence for business records "is not 'a parade of horribles."' Shapiro v. U.S., 335 U.S. 1, 55
(1948).
28. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 600 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 590 (citations omitted).
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justifications. Adult incest may lead to an increased rate of genetic
deformities among children, and prostitution presents a danger of violent
crime to women; laws against these acts do not rely solely upon morality.
Even if it could be shown that Scalia's parade of horribles may be
legally avoided without employing morals legislation, his argument still
carries a great deal of rhetorical force. Looking at the central piece of
Scalia's parade of horribles-that the reasoning in Lawrence will increase
the likelihood of lifting prohibitions against gay marriage-in order for this
argument to be effective, one must share Scalia's negative attitude toward
gay marriage. It stands to reason that for those who believe society is in a
freefall of moral decay, Scalia's incantations are more proof of the future
evils that Lawrence is likely to bring about. If one agrees that the bottom of
the slope identified by Scalia is undesirable and that the current decision
makes that consequence more likely, then the slippery slope argument has
been successfully employed.

IV.

CONCLUSION

As has been shown, the slippery slope argument tends to offer a choice
between two unacceptable options, which adds little value to the search for
sound public policy. Although a slippery slope argument may be a useful
tool for critically analyzing an opposing argument, its inherent tendency to
foster poor decision making should caution policy makers to avoid its use.
It is this author's contention that if given a choice, policy makers would be
wise to base their decisions on principle and reason rather than the fear of
sliding down a slope.

